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Report of the Peacebuilding Commission

Report of the Secretary-General on the
Peacebuilding Fund

Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit

Strengthening of the United Nations system

**Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the
immediate aftermath of conflict****I. Introduction**

1. In 2009 I submitted my report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (A/63/881-S/2009/304) to the Security Council and the General Assembly. I outlined how the United Nations and the international community could support national efforts to secure sustainable peace more rapidly and effectively, including in the areas of coordination, civilian deployment capabilities and financing. In its subsequent presidential statement of 22 July 2009 (S/PRST/2009/23), the Council invited me to report within 12 months on progress achieved in fulfilling the agenda for action set out in that report, taking into consideration the views of the Peacebuilding Commission. Accordingly, following consultations with the Peacebuilding Commission on 23 June 2010, I am submitting the present report to the Security Council and the General Assembly.

2. The challenges that the international community faces in peacebuilding have not diminished since my last report. Indeed, the current agenda of the Security Council reflects their range and depth, from Timor-Leste to Sierra Leone or Nepal, where the emphasis is on consolidating progress towards lasting peace and preventing any relapse into conflict, to the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Chad, where the peacekeeping operations that directly enable continued peacebuilding efforts face unique challenges. Even in country situations as diverse as post-earthquake Haiti, or the Sudan after the expected referendum, where meeting urgent humanitarian needs or securing stability are the most immediate demands, our underlying long-term challenge remains how to build sustainable peace.



3. I welcome therefore the increasing emphasis that Member States are placing on the need to ensure the sustainability of the international community's peacebuilding efforts. I share the determination of Member States, clearly expressed in the recent debates of the Security Council on peacebuilding and on transitions from peacekeeping, to support more effectively the efforts of post-conflict countries to make a decisive shift to an enduring peace. The preparations for the Group of Eight summit in 2010 and the World Bank *World Development Report 2011* likewise show the importance the international community attaches to the prevention of violence and sustainable peacebuilding.

4. Peacebuilding is primarily a national challenge and responsibility. But the international community, including the United Nations, has a critical role to play in supporting the national agenda. Our response must be a collective effort, with all the pillars of the United Nations — peace and security, human rights, development and humanitarian — fully engaged in support of a common vision. International standards, including human rights standards, must underpin all the efforts of the international community. My last report set out an ambitious agenda for action that called for stronger leadership, more effective strategies and planning, strengthening our coordination within the United Nations system and our capacity to deliver, predictable deployment of civilian capacities, more productive United Nations-World Bank engagement, furthering national ownership, strengthening national capacity development and improving peacebuilding financing. Across this broad agenda we have taken steps towards strengthening the United Nations response while advocating for an earlier, more coherent response from the wider international community.

5. Progress has been made in several areas, including leadership, civilian capacity, financing and increasing system-wide coherence. But we still have a long way to go. The strategic and management changes needed at Headquarters to enable the United Nations to deliver more effectively will take longer than one year to translate into real impact on the ground. In some areas, such as predictability of response and national capacity development, much greater efforts are required with and from our international partners, including other key multilaterals such as the international financial institutions and Member States, regional organizations and civil society, to reach agreement on how we will work together to address the continuing challenges. Our impact in country will be greater when complemented by a more coherent response from the international community.

6. Events of the last year have presented many opportunities for implementing this agenda, in country situations that range from the immediate aftermath of conflict, longer-term peace consolidation, and the transitional periods in between. This progress report includes examples of our experience from these diverse contexts because they all yield useful lessons for that crucial immediate post-conflict period.

7. The support of Member States for my report last year created valuable momentum towards implementing my agenda for action, which I gratefully acknowledge. Member States are key stakeholders in peacebuilding and share the responsibility for its success. I rely on them, therefore, to play their part in our collective effort — not just through the commitment of resources, but through coherent, consistent and sustained participation in all the various peacebuilding forums.

II. Effective leadership, coordination and accountability

8. One of the core elements of the agenda for action in my last report was the need for stronger, more effective and better supported United Nations leadership teams on the ground. Identifying and deploying individuals with the requisite knowledge and experience in post-conflict or post-crisis settings remain a critical challenge. I consider it a priority to ensure that suitably qualified leaders are deployed as early as necessary and that senior leadership teams are functioning effectively and are held accountable.

9. Over the past year, efforts have been made to better assist in bridging leadership gaps in field missions. Seasoned managers from across the United Nations system have been deployed more systematically at short notice, for short periods of time, to bridge these gaps. Effective examples can be seen in the dispatch of temporary leadership to the missions in Haiti, Somalia, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Afghanistan. In Haiti, where a fragile, conflict-prone country suffered a devastating earthquake that took the lives of my Special Representative, the Deputy Special Representative, the Police Commissioner and many other key staff, I immediately dispatched two of my most senior officials to fill the gap, supported by teams of strong staff. We will continue to build on and learn from these cases by increasing the pool of individuals with the necessary range of skills and experience who can be called upon to undertake these temporary assignments.

10. Our experience in Haiti also illustrates the importance of reinforcing leaders with properly equipped and trained teams of experts. Multidisciplinary teams with expertise in peacekeeping planning and mission support, including former staff of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) with valuable local knowledge and experience, were deployed jointly by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support. United Nations agencies, too, rapidly deployed staff with relevant experience, including senior experts to support the post-disaster needs assessment. I reiterate my request to Member States to support my initiative to create and train unified teams of experts, from across the United Nations system, to support senior leaders deployed in the immediate aftermath of conflict or other fragile situations. This is vital to crafting coherent peacebuilding strategies from the very start.

11. To reinforce these efforts to deploy the right leadership, a senior level mechanism has been introduced at Headquarters to help ensure that leadership teams in the field, in integrated settings, function effectively and to troubleshoot in instances where they do not. This collective approach will enable Headquarters to better address the range of issues faced by senior United Nations representatives and promote more integrated and effective leadership teams on the ground.

12. In order to strengthen my senior leaders' accountability, I have extended the application of the senior manager's compact to leaders of peacekeeping operations and special political missions. The field compact has been aligned with the senior manager's compact at Headquarters for consistency in the assessment of leadership performance across the Organization. At the same time, the field compact has been tailored to ensure its relevance to the field, and to improve coherence between mission and Headquarters leadership in support of mandate implementation. All senior managers of peacekeeping operations and special political missions will have completed their compacts by June 2010.

13. In my last report I noted that stronger, more effective leadership in the field requires improved guidance and support from Headquarters. In this regard, the Integration Steering Group, which includes the peace and security, humanitarian, and development actors across the United Nations system, has provided new guidance and minimum standards for Headquarters-based task forces charged with providing coherent policy guidance for peace consolidation in 18 countries where there is both a Mission and a United Nations country team. These task forces now include field colleagues and can act as important drivers of a coherent United Nations approach during challenging periods or transitions. They meet regularly at the Director and even the Principal level in response to crises or to plan future strategies.

14. We have also taken action to improve Headquarters support to resident coordinators and United Nations country teams, focusing particularly on countries facing complex political challenges that do not have a resident United Nations peacekeeping or political mission. United Nations Headquarters representatives and resident coordinators convened in October 2009 to discuss how United Nations country teams can help national counterparts to manage or resolve emerging challenges, and what support they need from Headquarters to do so. As a result, efforts are under way to strengthen cooperation between United Nations Headquarters and country teams, including more systematic communication, operational assistance and technical expertise, and enhanced training for Headquarters and field staff.

15. This new approach was applied in Guinea, for example, where the United Nations has worked closely with regional and international partners to support an inclusive, peaceful return to constitutional order following the military's seizure of power in December 2008. The office of the Resident Coordinator was strengthened with expertise in mediation, strategic planning, external communications, advocacy, electoral assistance, and project implementation. Allocations from the Peacebuilding Fund were reprogrammed in support of the transitional framework agreed in January 2010, including funding for the Joint Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)-African Union-United Nations security sector assessment, with additional funding to assist the ECOWAS-led mediation efforts by President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights is opening a country office in Guinea to help the Government address the underlying causes of violence and instability. The United Nations system on the ground in Conakry is now better positioned to support Guinea in addressing its transition priorities.

16. Similarly, following the coup in Honduras in June 2009, the Resident Coordinator received additional support from Headquarters. A joint UNDP-Department of Political Affairs mission was dispatched to assist the country team in reviewing and adapting its governance programmes. A senior official from the Department of Political Affairs participated in a high-level visit of the Organization of American States (OAS) to Honduras in October 2009 to facilitate dialogue between the parties, and a consultant has now been deployed to support the process of reconciliation and national dialogue.

17. Progress has also been made in enhancing the analysis and planning capacities of Resident Coordinators' offices. A mechanism has been created to fund a core group of experts who can be deployed to Resident Coordinators' offices on a longer-

term basis, following on from temporary deployments, thus ensuring continuity of support. Experts have deployed to seven countries so far, including Nepal, Guinea, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic.

III. Assessment, planning and strategy

18. In my last report I stressed the need for the United Nations to improve its ability to agree on and deliver a critical set of priorities for early post-conflict environments. These priority areas span development, peace and security and human rights, reflecting the interlinked and mutually reinforcing nature of these areas, as repeatedly emphasized by Member States, including in the 2005 World Summit Outcome. In the past year, we have made significant progress towards developing integrated strategies for peace consolidation. However, earlier attention and stronger planning capacities are needed to achieve the goal set out in my last report: to agree rapidly on a common approach in the immediate aftermath of conflict. The challenge of preserving humanitarian space in these situations adds to the complexity of coordinating a response.

19. Efforts in this area are supported by the new United Nations system-wide guidelines for the Integrated Missions Planning Process, which are mandatory in 18 locations with a United Nations Mission and United Nations country team.¹ These new guidelines, endorsed by the full range of peace and security, humanitarian, human rights, and development actors within the United Nations system, set standards for Headquarters and field-based integrated strategy and planning. They include two significant changes that complement my agenda for action: first, the requirement for senior leadership teams to directly oversee and drive integration processes with the aim of improving the collective peacebuilding effort of the United Nations; and, second, the development of integrated strategic frameworks for peace consolidation that promote mutual accountability by attributing roles and responsibilities to individual agencies and the Mission. In Liberia, for example, detailed operational workplans drawn up under the combined United Nations Development Assistance Framework integrated strategic framework are used by my Special Representative to identify resource gaps and track delivery rates. The most recent integrated strategic framework exercise, in the occupied Palestinian territory, where roles and responsibilities were already fairly clear, facilitated agreement about how the different strategic activities would be implemented. These initial integrated strategic framework exercises are also revealing the inherent challenge in preparing common frameworks that bring together Missions and United Nations agencies, with their varied budget sources and planning cycles, and thereafter ensuring adequate and timely financial resources for the key priorities.

20. Early lessons learned on United Nations transitions and reconfigurations in the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau and the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic integrated peacebuilding missions, as well as the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Nepal, point to the inadequate nature of the financing arrangements for these types of special political missions in the field. The lack of pre-mandate commitment

¹ Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nepal, Timor-Leste, Kosovo and Haiti.

authority and access to predictable and adequate resources meant that ad hoc arrangements were needed to conduct these complex exercises, creating significant obstacles to the smooth and timely establishment of the new missions, integration with others, and implementation of their mandates. There is a compelling need to address this, particularly since the Security Council increasingly relies on such missions to support critical political and peace consolidation processes, including protecting peacekeeping investments. I intend to submit proposals to the sixty-fifth session of the General Assembly to address this fundamental gap in our collective ability to successfully field these missions.

21. In my last report I encouraged my senior representatives in country to convene relevant actors in the immediate aftermath of conflict and to develop early strategy and action plans to address immediate national priorities. Over the past year we have tried to apply this approach in countries undergoing various forms of crisis. In Guinea the United Nations was able to use Peacebuilding Fund resources to kick-start a common peacebuilding approach: to develop a short-term strategic plan that focused on supporting the political process, humanitarian needs, security sector reform and human rights; and, by adjusting the Peacebuilding Fund priority plan, to respond to emerging needs, including help for victims of sexual violence and strengthening capacity to prevent sexual violence in future.

22. In early 2009 the United Nations response to the Djibouti Peace Agreement and the inauguration of a new Somali President showed its ability quickly to produce a prioritized, costed action plan, in conjunction with the World Bank, given effective coordination between the Resident Coordinator and senior mission leadership, and with Member States. However, the subsequent difficulty of attracting new funds to implement the identified priorities shows the importance of Member States' readiness to be flexible and tolerant of risk in cases of similar urgency.

23. In the wake of a crisis, an immediate United Nations response will be needed, including on the future of United Nations programming, and even before an early strategy can be developed, as for example after the coups in Honduras and Madagascar. I have instituted a policy to establish an interdepartmental working group within 24 hours of any unconstitutional change in government, in order to determine a strategic response. Notwithstanding the urgency, these must still be collective decisions involving Headquarters and the field, reflecting an understanding of country needs and United Nations capacities and space for action.

24. This strategic planning at Headquarters must be backed up by corresponding coordination structures in the field. After the Haiti earthquake, despite initial difficulties in coordinating a system-wide response, MINUSTAH and the country team worked together to undertake an integrated strategic planning process that informed a rapid review of the Mission mandate. This forms an early basis for an integrated strategic framework, which should be aligned to the emerging national planning process. While our aim should be to support nationally owned planning processes, we saw in Haiti how difficult it is to realize true national ownership when national capacity has been devastated. In such cases we must avoid the trap of diverting too much national capacity to the planning process too early, thus depriving Governments of the capacity they need to carry out their essential functions.

25. Thorough conflict analyses are vital in identifying the most urgent peacebuilding priorities. The post-conflict needs assessment, a critical tool for bringing the international community together around common priorities, has been adopted by the United Nations Development Group (UNDG), the World Bank and the European Commission as a common and joint methodology. Efforts have been made to expand this partnership to other regional institutions such as the African Development Bank. A joint expert roster and training is being developed in order to provide more coordinated, timely and predictable support to post-conflict needs assessment exercises.

IV. National capacity development

26. In my last report, I emphasized national capacity development as the cornerstone of all peacebuilding efforts. National leadership is crucial because it enables national actors to set priorities and engage international partners in support of a common vision. Developing capacity at subnational and local levels is also essential. Women's capacities to engage in decision-making or contribute to economic recovery, which are often overlooked, require particular attention.

27. To achieve these ambitious goals, more must be done to mainstream national capacity development as a system-wide priority and to integrate short-term interventions into longer-term strategies for peacebuilding. For example, with financing from the Peacebuilding Fund, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in Nepal has supported community-based programmes that help children associated with armed groups reintegrate into their communities. In addition to helping over 10,000 individual children since 2009, of whom 39 per cent are girls, support is also provided to community structures, including 195 schools, thus developing local capacity to prevent conflicts from recurring.

28. But such approaches have to be mainstreamed from the very start. In the immediate post-conflict period in Liberia, the United Nations and the World Bank initially tried to address the widespread lack of national capacity by injecting technical experts, many from the Liberian diaspora, into critical government offices. While these secondments are considered to have been necessary and largely successful, they were not always designed to build local capacity. The resulting gap is being addressed only now by a newly developed capacity development strategy that will be monitored by a permanent Government Office for Capacity Development.

29. The international review of civilian capacity now under way is founded on the premise that deployment of international experts should always be based on an assessment of existing capacities, local and regional, and geared to support national capacity development efforts. For example, in Afghanistan, UNDP and the World Bank have supported the Capacity for Afghan Public Service, which has enabled coaches from Afghanistan and the region, including senior civil servants from India, to work alongside 22 Afghan ministries to implement institutional reform.

30. Various initiatives are under way to improve the tools and approaches of the United Nations to strengthen national capacities after conflict. The inter-agency security sector reform task force is developing practical, field-oriented guidance on priority areas, including supporting national ownership and international coordination of security sector reform processes. A roster of security sector reform

specialists is now available for short-term deployments. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is developing guidance for Civil Affairs Officers on capacity strengthening for local authorities and supporting national ownership. The post-conflict needs assessment toolkit is being expanded to help conduct capacity assessments and identify capacity development priorities that integrate political, security, economic and social aspects of recovery. UNDP is testing and adapting its capacity assessment, programming and measurement approaches, in order to make the UNDG capacity development methodology more applicable in post-conflict situations.

31. There continues to be a serious gap in national capacities to ensure a stable transition from conflict to sustainable peace and development: the inability of national and community level actors to manage or resolve new or recurrent tensions that might spark renewed conflict. The United Nations has accelerated work to address this gap, developing guidance and training programmes to reinforce national capacity in conflict management, from natural resources to implementation of peace agreements. The Civil Affairs components of United Nations peace operations devote increasing attention to strengthening national capacity to manage inter-community conflict, drawing on existing local capacity. In Liberia, the joint programme on country support team combines the local presence of Civil Affairs components with the programmatic expertise of five United Nations agencies to support county and district administration across Liberia. In Darfur, the United Nations has supported the unique role of the native administration in resolving community disputes and has enhanced access to justice and dispute resolution through 15 legal aid centres across the Sudan. And in Nepal, the United Nations has worked to pre-empt tensions during elections by assessing high-risk areas in advance and deploying civil affairs teams there. In advance of the referendum in southern Sudan, national United Nations volunteers are being deployed to help communities reach lasting agreements over land and water and to resolve local tensions before they turn violent. In Burundi, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) implemented a Peacebuilding Fund project to strengthen the capacity of the National Commission for Land and other Properties. The project resolved over 2,000 land conflict cases, prompting a substantial increase in the number of refugees returning from the United Republic of Tanzania for whom land disputes had been a major concern.

V. Women and peacebuilding

32. My report last year emphasized that more concerted efforts were needed to address women's post-conflict needs and to increase opportunities for women to engage in decision-making and economic recovery. At the request of the Security Council, I am preparing a report that will lay out an agenda for action, which should be implemented and monitored as an integral part of this broader peacebuilding agenda. Recommendations in that report will address boosting the role of women in mediation processes; ensuring United Nations operations have adequate personnel to address women's post-conflict priorities effectively; enhancing women's participation in politics and elected office; and increasing the level of post-conflict financing devoted to promoting women's empowerment.

33. In the meantime, good progress has been made towards tracking gender-related allocations in United Nations-managed pooled funds. A gender marker was

introduced in the revised guidelines of the Peacebuilding Fund. The Fund, which to date has allocated 13 per cent of its expenditure to projects that target women beneficiaries and aim to advance gender equality, intends to increase allocations in this area significantly. UNDP now scores all project outputs based on their expected contribution to gender equality. Preliminary analysis suggests that, of 5,820 projects, 22.3 per cent (representing 31 per cent of the budget) were expected to significantly contribute to gender equality. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has piloted a gender marker in Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Yemen and Ethiopia, to be rolled out in 2010. UNICEF will also test a gender marker in various locations in 2010. These pilots show that the marker not only helps track gender expenditures, but also improves gender mainstreaming in projects and helps advocate for increased funding.

VI. Predictable international support: an effective United Nations response

34. In my last report I stressed that national and international efforts in the early post-conflict period should ensure predictable support in the core priority areas of peacebuilding, basic safety and security; support to political processes; the provision of basic services; restoring core government functions; and economic revitalization. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, where the Government launched in June 2009 a stabilization and reconstruction plan in conflict-affected areas of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, national and international partners chose to adapt the existing United Nations strategy as the primary mechanism for international assistance. The strategy was revised to focus on security, political processes, the restoration of State authority and sustainable return and reintegration, with a cross-cutting focus on combating sexual violence. Support to reform of the security sector and the justice and corrections sector, as well as efforts to create livelihoods and promote agricultural productivity, have helped build security and stability. Coordinated efforts by the World Food Programme and UNICEF have helped the reintegration of child soldiers through schooling, feeding and protection programmes.

35. Some progress has been made towards ensuring predictable support in these core areas, but much remains to be done. Arrangements already exist within the United Nations to deliver a more predictable response on rule-of-law assistance; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; security sector reform; mine action; mediation; and electoral assistance. These arrangements are being reviewed at a senior level, with the reviews of mine action and mediation already completed.

36. In some areas, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, mediation, mine action and electoral support, the internal policy, guidelines and division of labour among United Nations entities are relatively well developed. Building on the good practice of the United Nations focal point for electoral support, focal points for each thematic area should act as a service provider to the United Nations system, with the provision of commensurate resources, and as a source of comparative knowledge and specialist expertise, including standing capacity and expert rosters, on which the whole United Nations system, national authorities, regional organizations, civil society actors and others may call. For example, the review of arrangements on mediation is focused on reinforcing the role

of the Mediation Support Unit of the Department of Political Affairs as a global service provider, having provided operational support to 23 peace processes and capacity-building for national actors, United Nations and regional organizations.

37. But even in the areas where there is a reasonable degree of internal clarity, we face other obstacles to predictability and effectiveness on the ground, such as a lack of predictable, flexible and sufficient funding; human resource procedures that hamper flexibility and rapid deployment; a shortage of deployable specialized capacities; or the challenge of coordinating a multiplicity of actors beyond the United Nations. Moreover, in mine action, the internal policy has not always provided sufficient coordination authority to ensure rapid, predictable and effective delivery in complex post-conflict environments, and it will be under review by inter-agency mine action partners. And in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, the clear division of labour among actors in peacekeeping operations is not yet equally well established in integrated peacebuilding missions.

38. In the case of electoral assistance, the newly established inter-agency coordination mechanism for United Nations electoral assistance and the revised note of guidance outlining the respective roles and responsibilities of the Department of Political Affairs and UNDP have helped further to clarify roles and responsibilities, but more needs to be done. Given the complexity, cost and high profile associated with Security Council-mandated electoral activities, the lead role of the United Nations focal point needs to be established more firmly. Moreover, the variety of actors outside the United Nations presents a broader challenge of coordination, particularly in translating clearer arrangements at Headquarters to activities in the field. I recommend that the Security Council, when mandating the United Nations to provide electoral assistance, also mandate the United Nations to assist the relevant host country authority in coordinating efforts.

39. In areas where the reviews of existing arrangements are still ongoing, such as security sector reform and rule of law, the reviews are focusing on global roles and responsibilities, as well as addressing the challenges of capacity and delivery at the country level. Notwithstanding the successful examples of United Nations assistance to rule of law on the ground, for example in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti and the Sudan, efforts to ensure predictable delivery in core peacebuilding areas are still hampered by the lack of quickly deployable expert capacity, inadequate donor funding and coordination, and a multiplicity of funding sources that fail to ensure sustained and coordinated support to all critical actors. In this regard, I call upon Member States to support the overall coordination role of the United Nations in core peacebuilding areas, where mandated, at the country level. The coordination of disparate efforts in support of a nationally owned strategy is a prerequisite for ensuring lasting progress in each of these areas.

40. In sum, our analysis so far reveals that clear roles and responsibilities at the global level promote predictability of delivery, and that having a focal point for each thematic area as a resource for planners and United Nations leaders in the field helps ensure coverage of gaps. On the one hand, the United Nations needs practical flexibility based on country-level capacities and presence, and, on the other hand, it would be important to establish clarity in those areas where it is lacking, particularly rule-of-law assistance and security sector reform, including through completing the reviews of current arrangements.

41. In my last report I noted some additional areas where further clarity and predictability are needed. In the area of public administration, a review of country experiences in post-conflict public administration will be conducted with the World Bank and other partners, followed by initiatives to strengthen United Nations capacity, including the improvement of existing rosters. Contributions to this process include the 2010 report of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs entitled *Reconstructing Public Administration after Conflict: Challenges, Practices and Lessons Learned*. On the ground, the Civil Affairs components of various peacekeeping missions are supporting the restoration of State authority and local administration. In southern Sudan, for example, the United Nations has supported consultative processes with civil society, the transport of officials to their counties, use of local and national media to inform about the roles of government institutions and civic duties, and civic education workshops.

42. To support early employment generation, peacekeeping missions and United Nations country teams have worked together in Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti, Liberia and elsewhere to provide jobs for thousands and thus build confidence in the peace process. In Sri Lanka, UNICEF has helped develop livelihoods for children formerly associated with armed groups, and their families, through vocational training and other critical skills. To enable a more systematic approach, an inter-agency task force led by the International Labour Organization and UNDP has produced a policy paper and an operational guidance note on post-conflict employment creation, income generation and reintegration. It aims to help translate emergency employment programmes into sustainable national employment strategies, with particular attention to women and youth. Implementing this policy across the system will require resources to establish a dedicated team to support employment programming in post-conflict countries; stronger partnerships with other United Nations entities and the World Bank; and close collaboration with the Peacebuilding Fund to kick-start programmes for employment creation.

43. Regarding the reintegration of returnees (internally displaced persons and refugees) in the immediate aftermath of conflict, an inter-agency team led by UNDP, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and UNHCR is cataloguing current efforts and gaps in support of reintegration, with the aim of agreeing on an inter-agency framework for reintegration; strengthening coordinated planning and delivery in the field; and addressing the need for timely and efficient funding in the transition phase. For example, continued funding is essential to support the health and education services being provided by the humanitarian agencies in southern Sudan, vitally important to building stability and encouraging the return of those displaced by conflict. I urge Member States to continue to support United Nations efforts aimed at sustaining voluntary return and reintegration.

44. I wish to highlight two areas of increasing concern where greater efforts will be needed to deliver a more effective United Nations response. First, natural resources: a recent study by the United Nations Environment Programme concluded that 40 per cent of internal conflicts over a 60-year period were associated with land and natural resources, and that this link doubles the risk of conflict relapse in the first five years. Efforts have been made to draw early attention to these risks and to improve inter-agency coordination to address them, including by strengthening national capacity to prevent disputes over land and natural resources, as described in paragraph 31 above. Examples include programmes in Afghanistan, Timor-Leste and the Sudan, where coordination among several United Nations entities

addressing land and natural resource management has demonstrated the importance of an inclusive approach. In order to further deliver on the ground I call on Member States and the United Nations system to make questions of natural resource allocation, ownership and access an integral part of peacebuilding strategies.

45. Second, organized crime and trafficking networks pose increasing risks to the stability of State institutions and to the entire justice and security architecture in countries recovering from conflict or other crises. In West Africa, for example, a vicious cycle has developed where weak rule of law allows the proliferation of illicit activities controlled by organized criminal groups, which in turn undermine peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery. Failure to address these challenges threatens a relapse into conflict and instability for the States and the region. Strengthened regional approaches, much greater international cooperation and stronger inter-agency cooperation are needed now. I welcome efforts to support the implementation of the ECOWAS action plan to combat transnational organized crime through the inter-agency West African Coast Initiative.

46. The World Bank has significant expertise in certain core peacebuilding areas, including public administration and public finance, the rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic revitalization. Both the United Nations and the World Bank recognize that we should aim to maximize the effectiveness of our collective response to crisis or post-crisis situations. In this regard, we both acknowledge that effective response entails accountability and further clarity about our roles and responsibilities. In the field, allocation of roles and responsibilities will continue to be guided by relative resources, presence on the ground and the views of the host Government. This will help maximize efficiency, effectiveness and coherence with other actors. As emphasized in my last report, however, I continue to believe that gaps in global capacity must also be assessed globally, so that appropriate capacities are built and United Nations leaders in the field or national actors know where to go when they need specific resources or expertise.

VII. Predictable international support: strengthening civilian capacities

47. In my last report, I emphasized that rapid and effective support to countries emerging from conflict requires augmenting existing capacity on the ground and deploying additional international civilian capacity. Such capacities exist within the United Nations, Member States, regional and subregional organizations and non-governmental organizations. The challenge is to ensure that the efforts of these entities to deploy civilians are coordinated and coherent; that capacity corresponds to demand; and that the international community more effectively leverages capacities in the global South and among women. I therefore recommended that the United Nations undertake a review of international civilian capacity, to analyse how to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian experts available to meet these needs.

48. The review has begun, under my auspices, through the Peacebuilding Support Office. I have established a senior advisory group, led by former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guéhenno, that includes two of my Special Representatives of the Secretary-General from peace operations, the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Resources Management, and senior representatives from Member States and civil society. The review is consulting broadly across host

nations and Member States, civil society, field and Headquarters staff of the entire United Nations family, including the international financial institutions, donor agencies and technical cooperation entities.

49. The overall goal of the review is to strengthen the availability, the deployability and the appropriateness of civilian capacities for peacebuilding across the entire United Nations system. It will develop recommendations in various areas, including changes within the United Nations, to ensure that civilian capacities can be deployed effectively and efficiently across the United Nations family, with special attention to gender equity; frameworks to improve linkages between the United Nations, regional entities and Member States; ideas for how to strengthen and leverage civilian capacities from the global South and from among women; and strategies for ensuring that the deployment of civilian experts serves to develop sustainable national capacity. The review will also aim to leverage initiatives already under way among Member States and regional organizations, through regional consultations in which the senior advisory group will be actively involved.

50. The review is deeply into its first phase, drawing lessons directly from countries emerging from conflict and relevant United Nations field operations. Even at this early stage it is becoming increasingly clear that the international community struggles to consistently assess both local needs and existing local capacities, including the capacity to absorb assistance, before deploying international capacities. Augmenting national capacity with international expertise is often required in some critical areas, but it should be paired with capacity development and should have a clear timeline and exit strategy.

51. Initial findings focus on changes to be made within the United Nations in relation to capacity gaps, capacity development, and the challenges presented by the United Nations human resources management system in meeting the unique requirements of the immediate aftermath of conflict. In this context, significant changes are in progress to reform the recruitment and the selection system for Secretariat staff serving in field missions. This includes new contractual arrangements under one series of staff rules, which have enabled the integration of the field and Headquarters into one global secretariat. This new system will allow the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support to laterally move staff between field missions and between Headquarters and field missions, thereby facilitating faster deployments within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support to meet some of the needs presented in the immediate aftermath of conflict.

52. However, post-conflict situations are often non-family duty stations, and the lack of harmonized conditions of service within the United Nations system, especially for staff serving in non-family duty stations, has been a major obstacle to the ability of the United Nations to respond quickly to requests for specialized personnel in the immediate aftermath of conflict and to mobility within the wider United Nations system. This has been further exacerbated by difficult security environments, which have a negative impact on the ability of the United Nations to maintain operations in the countries where we are most needed. A review is therefore being conducted by the International Civil Service Commission on the conditions of service in non-family duty stations for the entire United Nations system. Ensuring the recruitment and the retention of staff in these situations is of utmost priority. In this context, it is also critical to ensure that conditions of service

being applied for staff members in non-family duty stations do not deteriorate. On this basis, I request the General Assembly to take action at its sixty-fifth session to address conditions of service in non-family duty stations in the United Nations common system.

53. A further challenge in the immediate aftermath of conflict is to secure highly specialized expertise on a short-term basis. To do so, the Organization needs to have the option of partnering with others, the capacity for enhanced and targeted outreach, and flexible funding and contracting modalities. The civilian capacities review is therefore also examining how to leverage initiatives under way among Member States and regional organizations. In this regard, the review will also examine the recruitment and the deployment models within the wider United Nations family, particularly those used by the humanitarian agencies to boost initial response capacity in the wake of natural disasters and complex humanitarian emergencies.

54. In my previous report I noted the value of standing capacities, an immediate resource of experienced United Nations staff to be deployed to meet urgent operational needs. I am pleased to note that Member States endorsed my recommendation that we build on the successful experience with the standing police capacity by ensuring the equally rapid deployment of justice and corrections capacities, in order to ensure a holistic approach to strengthening the rule of law in immediate post-conflict settings. Reinforcing standing capacities in key areas such as these will be a critical part of my overall review.

55. Finally, the review will also consider the role of the United Nations Volunteers (UNV) programme, which is making an important contribution to civilian capacities for peacebuilding. Over the past year 60 per cent of its 8,000 volunteers worked in post-conflict countries. Approximately 20 per cent of Civil Affairs staff in peacekeeping missions are UNVs. The UNV programme has made peacebuilding and early recovery priorities for the 2010-2012 period, and intends to expand its roster of volunteers for core peacebuilding areas.

VIII. Engagement with the World Bank

56. In my last report I reaffirmed the World Bank as a critical strategic partner of the United Nations in the initial post-conflict period. I committed to deepening the relationship and ensuring that it can be operationalized to leverage our respective strengths. Building on our 2008 Partnership Framework Agreement, I called for a mechanism for regular headquarters-level consultations on crisis and post-crisis countries of common concern, with the goal of improving our strategic coordination and collective impact.

57. We have since made progress towards closer institutional collaboration at Headquarters level. The United Nations and the World Bank are seeking to initiate a country-specific dialogue between senior officials at Headquarters and in the field on how we respond to emerging issues or concerns such as forthcoming elections or the prospect of rising tensions or economic shocks. The dialogue will be piloted in one country context with a view to its subsequent application in others. World Bank officials are invited with increasing frequency to United Nations high-level strategic policy discussions, including meetings of my Policy Committee. Senior United Nations officials receive regular briefings on key World Bank initiatives, including

the preparation of *Conflict, Security and Development: World Development Report 2011*. Joint activities include a capacity development workshop this June, part of a UNDP-World Bank State building initiative.

58. From an operational perspective, we are finalizing a programme to enhance the understanding of both institutions of the importance and modalities of joint work and to strengthen our collaboration at the country level and make it more systematic. This will comprise common analysis and assessment exercises, joint strategies and training and exchange of staff at Headquarters level. We will focus these efforts in several countries, including the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia. In addition, 11 United Nations agencies, funds and programmes have signed the Fiduciary Principles Accord, which facilitates transfers of resources between United Nations entities and the Bank, and makes it easier to manage our multi-donor trust funds. We intend to provide joint training and support to field presences in the application of the Accord. The Bank and the United Nations are working together to include regional development banks, other regional organizations and bilateral development agencies in our operational partnership.

59. The key challenge in our partnership is to ensure that the cooperation between our institutions becomes embedded in our *modus operandi*, is systematic and leads to improved delivery at the country level. The World Bank and the United Nations will continue to work together towards this end, and I urge Member States to assist us by ensuring that their guidance to the two institutions is consistent and reinforces this strategic objective.

IX. Financing for peacebuilding

60. Timely funding, aligned with national peacebuilding priorities, is essential for successful peacebuilding. Yet it is often lacking; hence the prescriptions in my last report for faster, more flexible, risk-tolerant funding mechanisms. I again urge donors to be bold and innovative in developing such mechanisms, and to continue to support early recovery and humanitarian assistance in the conflict and post-conflict period, thus building confidence in the peace process through visible, tangible dividends of peace.

61. The main donor forum for discussion of transition financing, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)/Development Assistance Committee (DAC) International Network on Conflict and Fragility Financing Task Team is expected to produce recommendations at the end of 2010 to increase the effectiveness of financing in transition situations. These may include improving efforts to measure transition financing across instruments and modalities, establishing a clearer link between financing instruments and national ownership, and improving the operation of pooled funding. A UNDG/Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs Task Team on Financing for Transition is providing a strong and coherent United Nations contribution to the International Network on Conflict and Fragility process.

62. The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund is one of several multilateral funds established to pre-position resources for rapid and early disbursement. As suggested in my last report, the Fund has revised its terms of reference and guidelines. It now comprises two funding facilities, the Immediate Response Facility and the

Peacebuilding Recovery Facility, which are focused on four areas: responding to threats to a peace process or supporting political dialogue; building national capacities to resolve conflict; economic revitalization; or re-establishing essential services. This new, simpler structure enables the Fund to provide both a flexible and an early release of funds for critical peacebuilding needs and a second catalytic release as other funds are mobilized, and in doing so to empower United Nations leaders on the ground and support a coherent, strategic response. In particular, the funding ceiling for immediate and urgent peacebuilding support has increased from \$1 million per project to \$10 million for a portfolio of projects under the new Immediate Response Facility. The Immediate Response Facility has since provided rapid funding to fill a critical gap in resources for elections in the Central African Republic and Burundi, and over \$8 million for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in southern Sudan, ahead of the 2011 referendum. Donors are increasingly participating in the country level joint steering committees, which have delegated responsibility to identify and approve projects for Peacebuilding Fund support. Such collaboration is critical if early Peacebuilding Fund intervention is to succeed in catalysing additional donor support.

63. As a result of these changes, the volume of Peacebuilding Fund allocations has increased substantially since 2009 and the targets for faster approval of project proposals and priority plans have largely been met, including approving Immediate Response Facility proposals within three weeks. The Peacebuilding Fund is now starting to address an issue raised by its Advisory Board: the need to measure outcomes and thus to demonstrate more clearly the impact of the Fund's interventions.

64. A joint donor review of the Peacebuilding Fund identified the need to clarify the comparative advantages of the existing global multi-donor trust funds and to improve their complementarity. A group of donors is now undertaking a study, in cooperation with the Peacebuilding Support Office, to examine these questions. The World Bank is conducting a study of the Bank's experience as a multi-donor trust fund manager that will also examine the partnership between the United Nations and the Bank. As for country-level pooled funding mechanisms, a review is under way, commissioned by the UNDG/Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs Task Team, to identify how these can contribute to greater aid effectiveness, including strengthened ownership, coordination, speed, flexibility and risk-sharing, and how to ensure coherence between several different pooled funds in one country, including humanitarian and development funds.

65. Developing national capacities to manage aid information and financial flows is important to sustainable peacebuilding. The Peacebuilding Support Office and UNDP are reviewing lessons learned from the implementation of aid management systems in post-conflict situations, in order to produce guidance on how the United Nations can better support post-crisis countries in managing their aid inflows effectively. They are now designing a proposal for a web-based repository of peacebuilding-related aid information management systems data as a resource for the Peacebuilding Commission and the wider peacebuilding community.

X. Role of the Peacebuilding Commission

66. In my report last year, I noted that the Peacebuilding Commission has a critical role to play in championing and promoting my agenda for action. I am heartened by their active and constructive engagement since then. For example, a recent discussion by the Commission on the international review of civilian capacity provided valuable perspectives on how the review can help devise a more coherent approach to national capacity development. Furthermore, the Commission has increasingly focused on strengthening its partnerships with the international financial institutions and regional organizations, including practical steps to institutionalize its relationship with the African Union.

67. The ongoing review of arrangements set out in the founding resolutions of the Peacebuilding Commission by the General Assembly and the Security Council has generated political momentum and offered Member States an opportunity to engage more deeply in questions about the future of the United Nations peacebuilding agenda. I am confident that Member States will focus the review on making the Commission's impact even more tangible, especially at the country level. I believe that one means to that end is for Member States to take greater ownership of the Commission's agenda and its advice.

XI. Conclusions

68. It is evident from the assessment above that considerable work remains to be done in order to implement my agenda for action and thus to support national efforts to build sustainable peace more effectively. We have seen improvements in certain areas, such as stronger and more accountable leadership. We have embarked on the essential project of strengthening civilian capacities, including the launch of the international review. We have also established United Nations system-wide standards for strategy and planning in mission settings that will, with continued effort, produce more coherent approaches to peacebuilding at the field level. But in other areas we still fall short of an effective and predictable response, including in areas fundamental to sustainable peacebuilding like close collaboration with the World Bank, predictable and norms-based delivery in core areas such as rule of law and security sector reform, and supporting national capacity development through significantly improved operational approaches. We must continue our efforts across the United Nations system to make the necessary changes and to ensure that changes at Headquarters lead to strengthened delivery in the field.

69. The United Nations cannot achieve these goals in isolation. A broader, collective effort is needed, based on strong partnerships with Member States, regional organizations, civil society, the private sector, the international financial institutions and other multilateral partners. Strengthening our relationship with the World Bank, and putting into practice on the ground the vision of collaboration and coordination expressed in our Framework Agreement, is especially important. Strong partnerships with national actors are also needed to further authentic national ownership of peacebuilding, without which we are unlikely to achieve sustainability.

70. The global economic downturn has inevitably put pressure on the availability of donor resources. It has also increased the economic challenges facing post-conflict countries. The need for timely, coherent and sustainable funding for

peacebuilding is therefore all the more important: funding that can be accessed quickly and for as long as it takes to consolidate peace, even when this is a long and difficult process. I urge Member States to make the necessary commitments to achieve this, including through the replenishment of the Peacebuilding Fund starting in 2011.

71. The various elements of this agenda for action are interdependent. If we fail to implement change in one area, progress in others will suffer. Equally, success in one area will bolster the chance of reaching our goals across the board. Fundamental to them all is consistency of support from Member States. I urge Member States to adopt consistent positions on peacebuilding issues across the various peacebuilding forums. For example, anything less than full support for my proposals for human resources reform will undercut the ability of the United Nations to deploy our staff to post-conflict and crisis situations with the necessary speed and flexibility. Likewise, if Member States do not send a clear, consistent message about clarity of roles and responsibilities — whether in the World Bank Governing Board, United Nations subsidiary bodies or elsewhere — then our goals become unclear and our direction weaker. The United Nations is strongest when its membership is united.

72. The agenda for action set out in my report last year was a huge challenge. We have made good progress towards our goals in some areas, but not enough in others. We must continue our efforts to implement the agenda in order to fulfil our commitment to deliver more effective support to peacebuilding. I am personally committed to leading this effort within the United Nations. I look to Member States, our other partners and all peacebuilding stakeholders to work with us towards that end.



Security Council

Distr.: General
20 July 2010

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Letter dated 15 July 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Burkina Faso to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the report on the work of the Security Council during the presidency of Burkina Faso in December 2009 (see annex).

The document was prepared under my responsibility, following consultation with the other members of the Security Council.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Michel **Kafando**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex to the letter dated 15 July 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Burkina Faso to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Assessment of the work of the Security Council during the presidency of Burkina Faso (December 2009)

During the presidency of Burkina Faso in December 2009, the Security Council had an extensive programme of work. It discussed and took action on the developments in Somalia, the Sudan, Cyprus, Côte d'Ivoire, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, the Middle East, Iraq and Guinea. The Council held 27 formal meetings, including 9 public meetings, of which one was an open debate on drug trafficking as a threat to international security. It also held three private meetings with troop-contributing countries and 15 closed consultations of the whole. The Council adopted 10 resolutions and 5 presidential statements. The President also read out three statements to the press.

Africa

Somalia

On 3 December, the Council met in consultations following the terrorist attack that occurred on the same day in Mogadishu during a graduation ceremony for Somali medical students at Benadir University, which killed civilians and the Somali Ministers of Health, Higher Education and Education. The Council members expressed their concerns and condemned the attack. After the consultations, Council members adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2009/31) condemning in the strongest terms the terrorist attack and expressing their condolences and sympathy to the victims' families, to the Transitional Federal Government and to the people of Somalia. Members of the Council also reaffirmed their full support for the Djibouti peace process and invited the opposition groups to renounce violence and join the reconciliation efforts. The members of the Council also reiterated their support to the African Union Mission in Somalia and expressed their appreciation to the Governments of Uganda and Burundi for their troop contributions.

Sudan

On 4 December, at a formal meeting, the Council heard a briefing from the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, who introduced his tenth report pursuant to Security Council resolution 1593 (2005). The members of the Council noted that since 2005 three cases had been initiated by the Court in connection with the situation in Darfur. They expressed their concern regarding the deterioration of the situation in Darfur. While some members expressed their support for the warrant against President Omar Al-Bashir of the Sudan, others thought that, even if the Security Council had to fight against impunity, it should also take into account the political progress made towards a settlement of the conflict in Darfur. Those members urged the Council to adjourn the said warrant in accordance with article 16 of the Rome Statute, as requested by the African Union, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement.

On 7 December, a statement to the press was read out by the President of the Security Council, condemning the attacks of 4 and 5 December on peacekeepers of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), which resulted in the death of five Rwandan soldiers, and expressing condolences to the families as well as to the Government of Rwanda. They encouraged the Government of the Sudan to investigate and to ensure that the perpetrators were identified and brought to justice. They also reiterated their full support to UNAMID.

On 21 December, the Council held a formal meeting followed by a private debate, to discuss the report of the African Union High-level Panel on Darfur (see S/2009/599). The head of the Panel, Thabo Mbeki, and the President of the African Union Commission, Jean Ping, briefed the Council on this occasion. A statement to the press was read out after the debate by the President of the Council, in which the members of the Council welcomed the report and the balanced recommendations therein, and agreed with the report that the causes and consequences of the conflict in Darfur had yet to be addressed. They also reiterated their support for the United Nations Mission in the Sudan and UNAMID, and for the efforts of the joint Chief Mediator, Djibril Bassolé, to promote a lasting political settlement for Darfur. They called on the Government of the Sudan and other parties in the Sudan and in the region to fully cooperate with President Mbeki and his team.

Côte d'Ivoire

On 7 December, the Council held consultations on the situation in Côte d'Ivoire. The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Alain Leroy, briefed the Council on the situation in the country, after the postponement of the first round of the presidential election, scheduled for 29 November 2009. According to the Under-Secretary-General, that decision was due to technical and financial constraints. Nevertheless, he noted positive steps taken by the Ivorian political actors, in particular the publication of the provisional voters list. The members of the Council took note of the postponement of the first round of the presidential election and welcomed the communiqué of 3 December 2009 of the Permanent Consultative Framework, according to which the election would be organized by the end of February or the beginning of March 2010. The members of the Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2009/33) on 8 December, in which the Council commended the Facilitator, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, for his efforts to support the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire, as well as the signature on 17 November 2009 by President Laurent Gbagbo of several military rules and regulations, including seven decrees, and urged the Ivorian actors to address the remaining tasks for the organization of open, free, fair and transparent elections. It also recalled that it will review the mandate and the troop level of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire by 31 January 2010, and requested the Secretary-General to provide it with a report in this regard.

Burundi

On 10 December, at a formal meeting, the Council heard a briefing from the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), Youssef Mahmoud, on the situation in Burundi, on the basis of the report of the Secretary-General (S/2009/611). During the closed consultations that followed, Council members welcomed the progress made in the peace process, due to the implementation by the Government of

Burundi of the Permanent Forum for Dialogue between agreed political parties. They also welcomed the agreement reached by the parties to adopt a revised electoral code and the beginning in July 2009 of the talks on a transitional justice mechanism. They commended BINUB and the Peacebuilding Commission for supporting the Government of Burundi in its efforts. Finally, they supported the recommendation of the Secretary-General to extend the mandate of BINUB for one more year. On 17 December the Council adopted resolution 1902 (2009) in this regard.

Central African Republic

On 15 December, at a formal meeting, the Council heard a briefing from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), Sahle-Work Zewde, on the report of the Secretary-General (S/2009/627) on the situation in that country. The Council members then met in informal consultations where they commended the efforts made by BONUCA as well as the country-specific configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission in supporting the Government to consolidate peace, enhance governance and complete the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. They welcomed the establishment of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic, which would replace BONUCA on 1 January 2010. They urged the Government to take all necessary measures to ensure the free, fair and transparent preparation and conduct of the 2010 elections. The members of the Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2009/35) on 21 December in this regard.

Liberia

On 15 December, the members of the Council held consultations to consider the report of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003) concerning Liberia. The Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Mohamed Shalgham of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, briefed the Council on the Committee's recent work, in particular its consideration of the final report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia. The members of the Council took note of the report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia dated 11 December 2009. They commended the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the Government of Liberia for its efforts to meet the conditions of resolution 1521 (2003). They also considered the extension for one more year of the sanctions measures and the mandate of the Group of Experts. On 17 December, the Council adopted resolution 1903 (2009) accordingly.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

On 10 December the Council held a private meeting with the countries contributing troops to the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), during which they interacted in a videoconference format with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General Alan Doss.

On 16 December, at a formal meeting, the Special Representative also briefed the Council on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. During the consultations that followed, the members of the Council took note of the thirtieth report of the Secretary-General (S/2009/623) and noted that the situation in the

Democratic Republic of the Congo was still a threat to international security in the region. They condemned the targeted attacks and the widespread sexual violence against the civilian population, as well as the recruitment and use of child soldiers perpetrated by illegal armed groups, in particular the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda and the Lord's Resistance Army. They requested MONUC to continue working closely with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and coordinating operations with the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the eastern part of the country to protect civilians and help the Government to restore its authority in that area. The members of the Council also called upon the States of the Great Lakes region to coordinate their efforts in addressing the threat to the regional security.

On 23 December, the Council adopted resolution 1906 (2009), by which it extended the mandate of MONUC until 31 May 2010.

Peace consolidation in West Africa

On 21 December, at the request of one delegation, the Council held informal consultations on the situation in Guinea. The Officer-in-Charge of the Africa II Division of the Department of Political Affairs, Sam Ibok, briefed the Council on this occasion. The members of the Council reiterated their concern about the killing of civilians that occurred in Conakry on 28 September 2009 and expressed their readiness to revert to the issue when the report of the Commission of Inquiry led by Mohammed Bedjaoui was issued.

On 23 December, at the request of one delegation, the members of the Council met again in consultations on the same issue. They took note of the issuance of the report, but could not consider it before it was translated into all official United Nations languages and before receiving instructions from their capitals.

Peace and security in Africa

On 23 December, the Council adopted resolution 1907 (2009), on the situation in Somalia and on the border dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea, in which the Council noted that the refusal of Eritrea to withdraw its forces to the status quo ante and to engage in dialogue with Djibouti or to accept bilateral contacts, mediation or facilitation and its non-compliance with the Djibouti peace process constituted a threat to international peace and security. The Council imposed upon Eritrea an arms embargo and some individual sanctions.

Middle East

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

On 7 December, the Council held a private meeting with countries contributing troops to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), at which participants were briefed about the developments relevant to the mandate of the Force.

On 14 December, in consultations of the whole, the Council considered the report of the Secretary-General (S/2009/597) and was briefed on this occasion by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Edmond Mulet, on the activities of UNDOF from 1 July to 31 December 2009. According to the Assistant

Secretary-General, the situation had remained calm and both parties, Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, had continued to respect the ceasefire. He noted that both parties continued to cooperate with the Force. On 16 December, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1899 (2009), extending the mandate of UNDOF until 30 June 2010, with an accompanying presidential statement (S/PRST/2009/34).

The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question

On 17 December, the Council heard a briefing on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question, from the Special Coordinator for the Middle East peace process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, Robert H. Serry. He said that negotiations had yet to resume between the two parties and confidence between the parties remained low. He noted the announcement by the Government of Israel that it would restrain certain settlement activity for a period of 10 months, and the decision of the Central Council of the Palestine Liberation Organization to extend the terms of the Palestinian Authority presidency and the Palestinian Legislative Council, until elections could be held. He referred to the readiness of the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, to continue to serve until elections are held. One member of the Council took the floor in the Council Chamber. During the consultations of the whole that followed, Council members called on the two parties to resume negotiations. A number of members expressed their concern about the situation in Gaza and called for the full implementation of resolution 1860 (2009). Some Council members reiterated the importance of implementing resolution 1701 (2006). Some members also called upon Israel to freeze all settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territory.

Iraq: Development Fund for Iraq and the International Advisory and Monitoring Board

On 17 December, the Council held informal consultations and received a briefing from the Controller, Jun Yamazaki, on the Development Fund for Iraq and the International Advisory and Monitoring Board. According to the Controller, the Government of Iraq has created a time-bound action plan to implement comprehensive oil metering which should improve transparency. The members of the Council expressed the need for increased transparency and accountability in the current and future successor Fund. On 21 December, the Council adopted resolution 1905 (2009).

Europe

Cyprus

On 9 December, the Council held informal consultations to consider the Secretary-General's reports on the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) (S/2009/609) and on his mission of good offices in Cyprus (S/2009/610). The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Cyprus, Taye-Brook Zerihoun, and the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for Cyprus, Alexander Downer, briefed the Council on this occasion. The members of the Council noted that the situation on the ground had remained calm and that substantive progress had been made by the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot leaders in fully fledged negotiations. The members of the Council welcomed the

implementation of some confidence-building measures announced by the two leaders and urged them to implement the remaining measures in order to build trust between the communities. They commended UNFICYP and the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for their efforts to assist the parties in conducting fully fledged negotiations in order to reach a comprehensive settlement of the dispute.

On 14 December, the Council adopted, unanimously, resolution 1898 (2009), calling on both parties to engage fully in consultations with UNFICYP on the demarcation of the buffer zone, with the view to reaching early agreement on outstanding issues. It also called on the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkish forces to restore in Strovolia the military status quo, prior to 30 June 2000. It decided to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for six more months, until 15 June 2010.

General issues

International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

On 3 December, the Council held a debate to consider the annual reports (S/2009/394 and S/2009/396) of the two Tribunals and their assessments on the implementation of the completion strategy (S/2009/589 and S/2009/587). The reports were presented by Judge Patrick Robinson, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and Judge Dennis Byron, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, assisted respectively by the Prosecutors, Serge Brammertz and Hassan Jallow.

The members of the Council noted that the two Tribunals were not in a position to complete their work in 2010 as recommended by the Council in resolutions 1503 (2003) and 1534 (2004).

On 16 December, the Council adopted resolutions 1900 (2009) and 1901 (2009), in which it underlined its intention to extend, by 30 June 2010, the terms of office of all trial judges at both International Tribunals based on the Tribunals' projected trial schedule, and the terms of office of appeal judges until 31 December 2012, or until the completion of the cases to which they are assigned, if sooner.

Peace and security in Africa: drug trafficking as a threat to international security

On 8 December, the Council, under the presidency of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Regional Cooperation of Burkina Faso, Alain Bedouma Yoda, held an open debate on the theme "Peace and security in Africa: drug trafficking as a threat to international security" on the basis of a concept paper submitted earlier by the Permanent Representative of Burkina Faso (S/2009/615).

Addressing the Council on this occasion, the Secretary-General, the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Antonio Maria Costa, the Commissioner for Human Development and Gender of the Economic Community of West African States, Adrienne Yandé Diop, and 18 delegations stressed with concern the threats to international security caused by drug trafficking and other transnational organized crime in many regions, including in Africa, and the increasing link between drug trafficking and the financing of terrorism. They also underlined the necessity of strengthening transregional and international cooperation as well as the coordination of United Nations actions, including

cooperation with INTERPOL, in order to fight against this threat at the national, regional and international levels.

They commended the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime for its important work in this regard and called on all States to comply with their obligations to combat drug trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime and to subscribe to the existing relevant international conventions, in particular the three United Nations drug conventions, and to implement them. At the close of the meeting, the Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2009/32).

Subsidiary bodies of the Security Council

On 14 December, at a formal meeting, the Council heard briefings by the following five outgoing members on the activities of its subsidiary bodies:

- Ambassador Le Luong Minh (Viet Nam), Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997) concerning Sierra Leone
- Ambassador Ranko Vilić (Croatia), Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism
- Ambassador Michel Kafando (Burkina Faso), Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1518 (2003) concerning Iraq
- Ambassador Abdurrahman Mohamed Shalgham (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003) concerning Liberia,
- Ambassador Jorge Urbina (Costa Rica), Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) concerning non-proliferation.

Counter-Terrorism Committee and Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate

On 14 December, in informal consultations, the members of the Council exchanged views on the report on the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001). The Council was briefed by Ambassador Ranko Vilić (Croatia), Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee and by Mike Smith, Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate.

The members of the Council commended the Executive Directorate for its visit on the ground and for its efforts in assisting States, in particular the West African States which are facing the Al-Qaida threat. They noted the engagement of those countries in providing all information and in coordinating their activities to fight against terrorism. The members of the Council urged the Executive Directorate to continue its efforts to find partners to support individually or collectively the above-mentioned countries in order to help them to improve border surveillance as well as arms and explosives control.

**Security Council**

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Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan**I. Introduction**

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1590 (2005), in which the Council requested that it be kept regularly informed of progress in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in the Sudan. The report provides an assessment of the situation in the country since my previous report, dated 5 April (S/2010/168), and its addendum, dated 27 April (S/2010/168/Add.1), as well as an update on the activities of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) up to 30 June 2010. In accordance with the Council's request, the report includes updates on support for the referendum and popular consultation processes, United Nations engagement with the parties on critical post-referendum tasks and planning for a United Nations presence in the Sudan after the end of the interim period.

II. Political developments**Elections**

2. Following national and state-level elections in April, the formation of governments, legislatures and related political institutions was the primary political activity in the Sudan during the reporting period. At the national level, Omer Al-Bashir was elected President of the Republic, with 68 per cent of the vote. Despite his withdrawal, Yassir Arman, the presidential candidate of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), won 21.6 per cent of the ballot. On 29 May, Salva Kiir Mayardit and Ali Osman Mohamed Taha were sworn in as First Vice-President and Vice-President respectively. In the new national Government sworn in on 16 June, the National Congress Party (NCP) was allocated 24 ministerial positions, including that of Minister for Foreign Affairs. SPLM was allocated eight positions, including the newly established post of Oil Minister, while three positions went to Northern opposition parties.

3. In Southern Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit was elected President of the Government of Southern Sudan, with 92.99 per cent of the vote. On 14 June, Riek Machar was sworn in as Vice-President of the Government of Southern Sudan. On 21 June, President Kiir issued a decree appointing his new Government, in which SPLM holds 27, NCP 2, and other Southern political parties 3 ministerial posts.



4. NCP secured a 72 per cent majority in the National Assembly by winning 319 seats. The SPLM share of the vote was 22 per cent, with 99 seats. Further representation in the National Assembly includes the Popular Congress Party, the Democratic Unionist Party, the Federal Umma Party, the National Umma Party, the Umma Reform and Development Party, SPLM-Democratic Change (SPLM-DC), the Democratic Unionist Party-Original and the Muslim Brotherhood. Three seats were won by independent candidates. In the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, SPLM won 159 seats, which amounts to 93.52 per cent of the total, while SPLM-DC won three seats. Seven seats went to independent candidates.

5. On 29 May, the Presidency formally requested the National Assembly to make appropriate legislative amendments in connection with the allocation of additional National Assembly seats in conformity with the 21 February agreement between the parties. The allocation of 40 seats for Southern Sudan, 4 for Southern Kordofan State, and 2 for Abyei is pending further agreement on the modalities for the allocation.

6. At the gubernatorial level, NCP candidates won the elections in all but one of the Northern states; only the incumbent SPLM Governor, Malik Agar, retained his seat, in Blue Nile State. Similarly, SPLM candidates won the gubernatorial elections in 9 of the 10 Southern states. The Western Equatoria governorship went to Bangasi Joseph Bakosoro, an independent candidate, formerly of SPLM.

7. During the reporting period, the Supreme Court received 188 election-related cases and rejected 177, including one challenge to the presidential results. Of the remaining 11, the Court reversed the results in 2 State Legislative Assembly election cases and voided the results in 4. It referred 5 cases to the National Elections Commission on procedural grounds; NEC rejected all 5.

8. A number of Sudanese political actors have criticized or rejected the elections as unfair, rigged or otherwise illegitimate. Many Northern opposition leaders denounced the process as "fraudulent", "corrupt" and "a farce". On 27 April, nine small Southern political parties, including SPLM-DC, issued a statement rejecting the results in the South. On 5 May, a coalition of Sudanese civil society organizations issued a press statement, claiming that widespread violations had "prevented the voters of Sudan from freely expressing their will and selecting their representatives". Independent Jonglei gubernatorial candidate General George Athor Deng, who lost, began an armed conflict after the results were announced, demanding the cancellation of the election results and the dissolution of the Government of Southern Sudan.

9. Elections were not held in April for 18 national and 26 State Assembly constituencies in 10 Northern and 4 Southern states for various reasons, including ballot-printing errors, candidate deaths and legal challenges. The National Elections Commission conducted elections for 31 of those constituencies in June, postponing polling for the remaining constituencies until after the rainy season. As in the April elections, UNMIS, in cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), provided extensive logistical support to the Commission and the State High Committees in the procurement, distribution and retrieval of polling materials, the repacking of sensitive materials, air transport to and from inaccessible locations and the storage of election materials. The African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) provided important logistical support for UNMIS electoral operations.

10. The National Elections Commission is seeking UNMIS, UNDP and other donor support for the postponed elections in Gezira and Southern Kordofan States. The new census exercise in Southern Kordofan started on 15 June. Following a request from the Central Bureau of Statistics, UNMIS transported census staff and materials from Khartoum to Kadugli. UNMIS is also anticipating a request for transport support at the end of the exercise.

11. On 4 and 5 May, UNMIS, UNDP and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems held a lessons-learned workshop to assess all aspects of international assistance for the electoral process. In addition, UNMIS conducted an internal lessons-learned exercise with a view to strengthening and improving its support for the forthcoming referendum processes. One of the key findings of those exercises was the need for an integrated United Nations approach, inclusive of the Mission, UNDP and other relevant United Nations country team members. Suggestions for the ongoing planning of referendum support included the creation of a joint support structure and enhanced coordination with national counterparts, including the Southern Sudan and Abyei Referendum Commissions, at all stages of the process.

12. On 7 May, the African Union Commission convened a high-level strategic review meeting between the African Union and the United Nations in Addis Ababa. Attended by representatives of the United Nations and the African Union, including the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, the meeting emphasized the importance of a strategic partnership between the two organizations at the critical time of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. On the following day, a consultative meeting on the Sudan was held in Addis Ababa to bring together representatives of the African Union, the United Nations, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the European Union, countries in the region, the permanent members of the Security Council and the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, as well as of Finland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Qatar and Sweden. At the consultative meeting, it was decided to establish a consultative forum, to be co-chaired by the African Union and the United Nations, which would serve as a mechanism to harmonize international efforts in support of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, post-referendum arrangements and the search for a political solution to the Darfur conflict. The forum will meet every two months, with the first meeting having been held in Khartoum on 17 July.

Preparations for referendums

13. Although the formation of governments was the focus for much of the reporting period, the parties have now begun discussions on the referendum processes. Following the inauguration of President Al-Bashir, the parties announced that they were committed to holding the referendum by 9 January 2011, the deadline mandated by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and that they had reached agreement that the national Government would work to "persuade the Southerners for voluntary unity".

14. On 7 June, the Presidency submitted to the National Assembly a list of proposed Southern Sudan Referendum Commission members, which was referred back to the Presidency on 14 June, owing to objections to one NCP nominee. After

the replacement of that nominee, the National Assembly endorsed the appointment of the Referendum Commission members on 28 June. The parties have yet to agree on the chairpersonship for the Abyei Referendum Commission, owing primarily to controversy in connection with the eligibility of voters in the Abyei referendum.

15. The prospect of a joint unity campaign is proving contentious. NCP insists that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement stipulates a pro-unity stance on the part of both parties and is reportedly considering relocating Vice-President Taha to Juba to supervise the campaign. Many in the South have expressed their reservations on this matter, arguing that it is too late to make unity attractive.

Integrated United Nations planning

16. Timely, flexible and integrated planning will be essential to permit the United Nations presence in the Sudan to meet the challenges of the next phases of the peace process: (a) preparation and conduct of the referendums (July 2010-January 2011); (b) support in the post-referendum transitional period (January-June 2011); and (c) support for peace consolidation in the post-Comprehensive Peace Agreement period (2011-2012). In anticipation of those needs, and in line with the Secretary-General's guidelines on integrated planning, in the reporting period UNMIS strengthened its Strategic Planning Cell and, jointly with the United Nations country team, established an integrated mission planning team in Khartoum.

17. In consultation with the Mission and the United Nations country team, my Special Representative has established five strategic objectives for the United Nations in the pre-referendum phase: (a) the organization of credible referendums in Southern Sudan and Abyei; (b) the organization of productive popular consultations in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States; (c) the negotiation of post-referendum transitional arrangements and their peaceful implementation; (d) the maintenance of a secure environment and the protection of civilians in the mission area; and (e) the development of governance and rule-of-law capacities in Southern Sudan. UNMIS and the United Nations country team have also drawn up an integrated action plan to coordinate the activities of the United Nations family in respect of those goals.

18. The national Government and the Government of Southern Sudan have both indicated a desire for expanded United Nations involvement in the conduct of the referendums, beyond the role played during the elections. A joint request detailing an expanded United Nations role in supporting the referendums, including monitoring, is expected shortly. UNMIS stands ready to provide increased technical and logistical assistance within its mandate and capacity. The Mission has developed a concept of operations and a staffing scenario for enhanced technical support for the referendum commissions, extending the deployment of electoral staff to the county level — 79 in Southern Sudan — and to Abyei. UNMIS is currently assessing available infrastructure in the South and has completed a resource and logistics requirements assessment for deployment in the North, the South and Abyei. UNMIS has also developed proposals to facilitate rapid decision-making by the commissions.

19. Resource requirements for support for the referendums were not included in the 2010/11 budget, as the level of assistance to be provided by the United Nations had yet to be defined. Pending requests from the referendum commissions, UNMIS will identify the costs required to support the referendums, while reviewing its capacity and prioritizing its existing resources to the extent possible without

undermining other mandated activities. Any unresolved resource requirements will be addressed through the authority vested in the Secretary-General and established processes for securing additional funding. In the interim, UNMIS has been requested to allocate resources for referendum support temporarily from the 2010/11 budget appropriation.

20. Planning for the role of the United Nations in the post-referendum phases will be developed over the coming months. It will be important to ensure the timely preparation of plans and options for the post-Comprehensive Peace Agreement period, while taking account of the negotiations between the parties and the evolving situation on the ground and preparing for a range of scenarios. To that end, the United Nations will undertake an integrated planning process in close coordination with the parties themselves and in consultation with key partners, including the African Union High-level Panel. I will provide updates on the status of post-referendum planning by the United Nations in subsequent reports to the Council. Options for changes in the mandate and configuration of the presence of the United Nations, which will be developed in the light of an updated strategic assessment, will be presented to the Council for its consideration shortly after the referendums. Meanwhile, within its existing mandate and capacity, UNMIS will adopt a flexible approach, adjusting short-term priorities to meet new needs and address requests for assistance that may be made by the parties in the transition period.

Popular consultations in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States

21. Since my previous report, there has been no substantive progress on the issue of popular consultations in Southern Kordofan State. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement stipulates the involvement of democratically elected representatives in the popular consultation process. The postponement of State legislative elections has thus limited options for moving the process forward. UNMIS has been pursuing options to encourage such preparations, including a joint project with the Peace Research Institute of the University of Khartoum on the popular consultations in both Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States. The objective is to assist in identifying topics of concern to the local population which might appropriately be addressed through the popular consultation mechanisms, the popular consultations themselves or related processes.

22. With an elected legislature in place, the popular consultation process is set to commence in Blue Nile State. From 23 to 25 May, the United States Agency for International Development and implementing partner AECOM organized a civic education workshop for approximately 1,000 participants, which led to a joint declaration of principles and a code of conduct in preparation for the popular consultation process.

Negotiations on post-referendum arrangements

23. On 24 June, the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed a procedural framework agreement in Addis Ababa governing formal talks on post-referendum arrangements. The negotiations are to be bilateral, with an African Union facilitator supported by the United Nations, IGAD and the IGAD Partners Forum to assist when needed. The parties expect to receive ad hoc international expert input on key issues as they arise, including financial matters, natural

resources, security and citizenship. The parties also agreed upon a joint Sudanese secretariat with administrative support from the Assessment and Evaluation Commission.

Abyei

24. The elections in Abyei were largely peaceful. Voters from the Abyei Area voted in either Warrap State or Southern Kordofan State. Although the decision not to conduct the Abyei gubernatorial and legislative council elections was controversial, it prevented the eruption of further tensions and conflict emanating from the controversy over the constituency of the area.

25. The seasonal migration has brought attendant challenges. Political tensions and disputes over the possession of weapons largely prevented the nomads from crossing the border from Abyei into Unity or Warrap States. Many nomads were also prevented from using the Kiir/Bahr al-Arab River as a water source for their cattle for the same reasons. The Misseriya tribes have now begun their return journey towards the North. The number of cattle lost owing to lack of water and pasture has yet to be ascertained. Although the tribes and local military units have avoided any large-scale violence, the situation remains extremely tense and fragile. UNMIS and the Abyei Area Administration have established local migration committees to help resolve migration-related tensions.

26. Some Misseriya continue to oppose the implementation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration decision regarding the borders of Abyei, and persistently block any progress on border demarcation. In the northern portions of the Abyei Area, Misseriya youths have accused the United Nations of bias in the delivery of humanitarian services and have, including through threats of violence, blocked the access of joint monitoring teams to some locations. Southern militias and, at times, Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) units, have threatened the United Nations country team, hindering it in its efforts to dig wells in the area, out of fear that the Misseriya would establish permanent settlements around such water sources and thus claim residence.

Wealth-sharing

27. According to the Petroleum Unit of the Government of Southern Sudan Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, the national Government transferred approximately \$669.92 million to the Government of Southern Sudan in the first quarter of 2010, pending an agreement on the sharing of Higlig oilfield revenues.

28. The national Government continues to transfer revenue shares to oil-producing states. According to the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Upper Nile State received \$18.560 million in oil revenues in the first quarter of 2010, Unity State \$12.571 million, and Southern Kordofan State \$7.122 million. Pursuant to the Abyei Protocol, Warrap State and the local Ngok Dinka tribe received \$179,000 each; the transfer of Misseriya shares awaits a decision by the Presidency.

29. The National Civil Service Commission has made limited progress in recruiting Southern Sudanese to the civil service, with only 1,039 recruitments, against the approximately 8,500 positions reserved for them. The Commission is still awaiting presidential directives on Darfurian and Eastern Sudanese representation.

Border demarcation

30. The Presidency has decided to begin demarcating agreed-upon areas, pending submission of a final written report. Following a request of the Technical Ad Hoc Border Committee, on 29 and 30 April UNMIS facilitated aerial reconnaissance of a 388 km section of the 1 January 1956 border, from Ethiopia to the meeting point between Upper Nile, Blue Nile and Sennar States. The Committee visited several points along the line by land to correct and verify geographical coordinates.

III. Implementation of other peace agreements

Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement

31. The political and security situation in Eastern Sudan remains calm following the elections. The three Eastern Sudan political parties representing the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement signatories (Beja Congress, the Free Lions Party and the East Democratic Party), secured only three seats at the State Assembly level — two in Red Sea State (Beja Congress and the East Democratic Party) and one in Kassala State (Free Lions Party). The East also secured representation in the national Cabinet. Significant progress has been made in the implementation of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement wealth-sharing provisions. The long-awaited donor conference for Eastern Sudan is now scheduled to be held in Kuwait in November 2010.

Darfur peace process

32. Following the April 2010 elections, talks resumed on 6 June between the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) and the Government of the Sudan. Representatives of civil society, internally displaced persons and refugees have been participating in the talks. The two parties have agreed on a work programme and have formed six committees to negotiate on the following areas: power-sharing and the administrative status of Darfur; wealth-sharing, including land rights; compensation for and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees; security arrangements; justice and reconciliation; and an agreement on the resolution of disputes.

33. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Government failed to agree on a ceasefire implementation protocol or a final agreement by the stipulated deadline of 15 March, owing largely to disputes over the participation of other movements in the peace talks and the insistence by JEM that all of its prisoners held in Khartoum be released by the Government of the Sudan. In May, JEM announced that it had frozen its participation in the negotiations in Doha; shortly thereafter, it withdrew its delegation from the talks. On 19 May, the Chairman of JEM, Khalil Ibrahim, was detained at the airport in N'Djamena and refused entry by the Chadian authorities. Following the incident, he travelled to Tripoli, where he remains.

34. On 12 July, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court issued a second warrant of arrest against President Al-Bashir, considering that there were reasonable grounds to believe him responsible for three counts of genocide committed against the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups in Darfur. I recognize the authority of the International Criminal Court as an independent judicial institution and trust that the Government of the Sudan will address the

issues of peace and justice in a manner consistent with Security Council resolution 1593 (2005).

IV. Security developments

35. After the elections, the security situation remained calm in the North, with the exception of the Darfur States. However, in the South, post-election disputes increased tensions. Fighting in northern Jonglei State and southern Upper Nile State between General Athor's supporters and SPLA, including an attack on an SPLA armoury south of Malakal (Doleib Hill) which left 14 SPLA soldiers dead, resulted in a significant deterioration of the security and human rights situations in the area, including killings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, rape, looting and destruction of property, as well as restrictions on critical United Nations staff movement. UNMIS, in collaboration with local elders, is assisting the Government of Southern Sudan to end the rebellion of General Athor peacefully.

36. Other instances of political violence included the mobilization of forces by David Yau-Yau, who had run as an independent candidate in Jonglei State after being refused the SPLM nomination. After losing the election, Yau-Yau's forces attacked SPLM troops in Jonglei State. In May, unidentified assailants ambushed a vehicle carrying the Shilluk Chief, Peter Oyath, in Upper Nile State, killing him and six others. SPLM accused SPLM-DC members of the Upper Nile State Legislative Assembly and the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly of involvement in the incident, and a criminal case was filed in Malakal against several SPLM-DC legislators. SPLM-DC maintains that it has been wrongly accused, claiming that the criminal case is a response to SPLM-DC electoral gains in Upper Nile State. The forced disarmament of civilians by the Government of Southern Sudan in communities perceived to be supporting SPLM opposition parties remains a concern, in particular in the context of the upcoming referendums.

37. On 3 April, an exchange of fire between SPLA and Joint Integrated Units of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in Raja, Western Bahr El Ghazal State, left four persons wounded and one dead. The Joint Integrated Unit commanders, with UNMIS support, acted quickly to contain the incident.

38. Tensions in and around Abyei and disputes in connection with Misseriya nomads carrying weapons during the migration sparked at least three incidents between SPLA units and nomads in Unity State that, reportedly, left 7 dead and 13 injured. The migration season otherwise passed without serious security incidents, despite heightened tensions.

39. The reporting period was marked by steadily increasing localized tensions and outbreaks of violence in several areas in Southern Sudan. During the reporting period, UNMIS received reports of 66 incidents of intercommunal violence in Southern Sudan, in particular in Warrap, Jonglei, Upper Nile, Western Bahr El Ghazal and Western Equatoria States.

40. Warrap, Lakes and Unity States have seen a marked increase in cattle-rustling incidents. At least 41 people were killed during the reporting period, including 6 SPLA soldiers protecting civilians in Warrap State. The Minister for Internal Affairs authorized county commissioners to cross the border between Lakes State and Unity

State, accompanied by SPLA, in order to identify and return stolen cattle. A similar exercise is envisaged for Warrap and Unity States.

41. As part of a conflict-mitigation strategy, UNMIS, UNDP, the International Organization for Migration and the International Republican Institute, a non-profit organization, continued to organize round-table discussions among political parties in all 10 Southern states. Smaller Southern political parties and independent candidates have also used such discussions to engage with SPLM in a neutral forum.

42. Early in May, UNMIS received reports of serious fighting between Rizeigat tribesmen and SPLA forces in Balbala, on the border of Western Bahr El Ghazal and Southern Darfur States. The exact reasons for the fighting remain unclear. Efforts by UNMIS to investigate the incident in its immediate aftermath were unsuccessful owing to restrictions on freedom of movement by SPLA. Efforts by UNAMID to reach the area from Southern Darfur were also unsuccessful owing to restrictions imposed by SAF. The matter was reportedly resolved on 17 May, with a ceasefire agreement signed by a Rizeigat delegation, headed by the acting Commissioner from El Deain (Southern Darfur State), and the Governor of Western Bahr El Ghazal State.

43. Also in May, the JEM launched an attack from Southern Darfur State into the areas west of Muglad in Southern Kordofan. On 8 May, an oil company guesthouse was attacked in Gibash. SAF helicopters were observed patrolling the area and, consequently, staff movement was restricted.

44. On 6 April, a small group of soldiers, allegedly belonging to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), attacked a village close to Ezo in Western Equatoria State, killing one civilian and wounding another. On 16 May, LRA reportedly ambushed a Government vehicle travelling from Yambio to Tambura, killing three Government of Southern Sudan officials. On 23 May, SPLA killed one LRA soldier in Nzara county, Western Equatoria State, and on 26 May, LRA reportedly attacked four civilians between Tambura and Namutina in Western Equatoria State, killing one and abducting three others.

Redeployment of forces

45. SAF has redeployed all of its forces from Southern Sudan, while SPLA redeployment remains at 35 per cent (20,622) of its stated strength (59,168).

Joint Integrated Units

46. The strength of the Joint Integrated Units has remained unchanged since April 2009 at 83 per cent of its mandated strength (39,639). The reverification process, which had been scheduled for completion by 15 November 2009, is still ongoing. UNMIS is currently facilitating donor-funded projects to improve water supply, sanitation, kitchen facilities and basic medical equipment at Joint Integrated Unit camps.

UNMIS military deployment

47. As at 30 June 2010, UNMIS had deployed 9,935 of the authorized 10,000 military personnel, including 496 military observers, 192 staff officers and 9,247 troops. The Mission completed the deployment of additional troops in March 2010 in accordance with the 2008 military capability study, bringing the Mission's force

strength to 99.1 per cent of the recommendation contained in the study. The priority operations for the reporting period were election support, conflict deterrence, the protection of civilians, security monitoring and planning for referendum support. UNMIS military election support focused on situational awareness and area security, logistical support and force protection for UNMIS staff. UNMIS has revised and updated its elections-oriented integrated contingency plan on the protection of civilians for use during the referendums.

Restrictions on freedom of movement

48. Both parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement have placed further constraints on the freedom of movement of UNMIS since the previous reporting period. As at 27 May, UNMIS had recorded 36 cases of restrictions on freedom of movement in 2010 by SPLA/the Southern Sudan Police Service and 5 by SAF. They included the impounding of 14 Bangladesh armoured personnel carriers by SAF and SPLA for a period of three months as well as denial of access and interference by a Sudanese member of the joint monitoring team with respect to patrols in the Balbala area during the SPLA-Rizeigat clashes in the border areas of Western Bahr El Ghazal and Southern Darfur. SPLA units also broke into UNMIS containers, detained patrols and, on one occasion, physically assaulted a United Nations military observer.

49. UNMIS continues to raise these issues through the appropriate governmental channels and Comprehensive Peace Agreement mechanisms. However, the restrictions have created considerable delays in the ability of UNMIS to decisively monitor and verify the Ceasefire Agreement and to assess situations with regard to the protection of civilians and humanitarian needs. Restrictions on the freedom of movement of UNMIS-contracted logistics convoys are also increasing the Mission's dependency on the use of force protection for logistics convoys and the already scarce aviation resources, which are increasingly required to ensure the timely sustenance of team sites.

UNMIS police

50. UNMIS has deployed 679 of the 715 authorized police advisers, including 105 women police officers, in 25 team sites throughout the Mission area. Operations during the reporting period focused on the training of 27,457 local Sudanese police personnel in elections security.

51. The Mission deployed a United Nations police officer in each of the 10 state-level Southern Sudan Police Service joint operation centres; two officers are embedded in the central joint operation centres. United Nations police began implementing a referendum training plan immediately after the elections. In close coordination with the Training Directorate of the Southern Sudan Police Service and with support from donors, the United Nations police propose to train 16,550 Southern Sudan Police Service officers and 1,090 Abyei Area police personnel in referendum security duties.

52. The United Nations police conducted 3,011 patrols in the Mission area during the reporting period, including joint confidence-building and long-range patrols with local police, United Nations military observers and other Mission components. Six Special Protection Units are currently operating in Southern Sudan, and 10 more are expected to be deployed in the near future. The United Nations police also provide

assistance in the training and equipping of a Livestock Patrol Unit to counter cattle-raiding in Jonglei State.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

53. As at 31 May, 23,345 candidates (18,365 in the North and 4,980 in the South) have been demobilized, including 5,558 women. On 23 March, demobilization activities resumed in Rumbek (Lakes State), following a temporary freeze due to the lack of food support. UNMIS and UNDP are working in close coordination with both the Northern and Southern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commissions to support the launch of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes in Kauda (Southern Kordofan State), Torit (Eastern Equatoria State) and Aweil (Northern Bahr El Ghazal State).

54. In close consultation with governmental authorities, UNMIS and UNDP are continuing to work together to reduce the gap between demobilization and reintegration. By mid-May, 18,340 disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme participants had been counselled on economic reintegration. In Northern Sudan, reintegration activities have commenced with regard to 2,054 participants, while in Southern Sudan the reintegration exercise was completed for 62 participants in mid-May. The Governments have signed agreements with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the German aid agency GTZ to provide reintegration support to 1,541 participants.

55. The Government of Southern Sudan suspended civilian disarmament during the polling period to avoid any perception that the exercise was targeting particular candidates or their supporters. The process has since resumed in the areas of Jonglei State dominated by the Murle tribe. SPLA indicated that civilian disarmament exercises will soon be extended to Eastern Equatoria State. However, the increased use of SPLA units for internal security and civilian disarmament has strained the relationship between SPLA and local communities. Accusations of SPLA politicization, poor discipline and participation in cattle raids threaten to exacerbate those tensions.

56. During the reporting period, SPLA demobilized a total of 202 children associated with armed forces and groups in Eastern Equatoria and Unity States. Despite the progress made in identifying and registering children for demobilization, their numbers remain significant.

Mine action

57. During the reporting period, the United Nations cleared 3,571,736m² of land and destroyed 2,248 anti-personnel mines, 309 anti-tank mines, 68,459 small arms and 22,021 items of unexploded ordnance. Other major accomplishments include the clearance of the Abu Gamul minefield in Kassala State, the minefield surrounding Malakal town in Upper Nile State, the Kurmuk minefield in Blue Nile State and areas in Southern Kordofan State. Through those activities, the United Nations supported the safe implementation of the Sudanese national elections and reconnaissance for border demarcation.

V. Protection of civilians

58. Working with the Government and United Nations agencies, UNMIS has scaled up its activities to deter violence and respond more effectively to protection needs. During the reporting period, early warning systems were established in Southern Sudan to collect and, where possible, verify information about communities under threat. Specifically, UNMIS undertook regular field missions and developed a reliable network of local communities and authorities. On the basis of information provided through the early warning system, UNMIS on several occasions dispatched joint civilian and military patrols to communities under threat with a view to conducting rapid situational assessments and identifying the steps that needed to be taken immediately by the Government of Southern Sudan, SPLA and the Southern Sudan Police Service and, where relevant, the United Nations, to improve community security and better protect communities, as was the case during the SPLA-Murle clash in Pibor and the clash between the SPLA and General Athor's forces in Khorfulus county, Jonglei State.

59. UNMIS also facilitated the creation of 35 protection of women groups in Southern Kordofan State. Efforts are currently under way to establish similar groups throughout Southern Sudan. Embedded and run by local communities, such groups serve as early-warning mechanisms at the local level.

60. The analysis of possible flashpoints carried out prior to the April elections continues to be regularly updated. On 5 April, UNMIS established a regional operations centre in Juba with a view to coordinating all security and operational information for Southern Sudan and ensuring integrated conflict analysis and subsequent recommendations to prevent, manage or resolve conflict throughout Southern Sudan.

61. An integrated security and conflict management concept is being finalized to enhance the response by the United Nations to possible incidents during the referendum period. UNMIS has developed a key leadership engagement plan to improve interaction with SAF and SPLA leadership and situational awareness and to ensure appropriate responses by UNMIS, SAF and SPLA. The integrated contingency plan developed for the electoral period has been revised so as to prepare a joint UNMIS/United Nations agency response to civilians seeking sanctuary in the event of violence during the referendum period.

VI. Humanitarian situation, recovery and return

Humanitarian developments

62. Localized insecurity continued to have serious humanitarian consequences in Southern Sudan during the reporting period, in particular in Jonglei, Lakes, Warrap, Unity, Western Equatoria and Eastern Equatoria States. More than 700 people are reported to have been killed and over 150,000 newly displaced since the beginning of the year. After a relative lull in the first quarter of 2010, attacks by LRA resumed during the reporting period. As of April, the humanitarian situation in Northern Jonglei State had become increasingly precarious owing to the ongoing military stand-off between SPLA and General Athor in Ayod county. The humanitarian community has prepared a contingency plan for a humanitarian response for up to 25,000 civilians in the area under threat.

63. The food gap in the South continued to put millions at risk. It was caused by a combination of widespread displacement, unexpectedly low crop production and the contraction of market access for tens of thousands of destitute households. The 2009/2010 Annual Needs and Livelihood Assessment, released on 13 April, anticipated that some 4.3 million people — nearly half the population of Southern Sudan — would be in need of food assistance at some point during 2010. All five nutrition surveys completed in hard-hit states have confirmed global acute malnutrition rates over the emergency threshold of 15 per cent.

64. In an effort to meet emergency needs and prevent a further deterioration in conditions, despite limited funding, humanitarian partners have been pre-positioning six core pipelines of urgent inputs in as many areas as possible before the rainy season restricts access. By May 2010, the World Food Programme had pre-positioned more than 50,000 tons of food aid throughout the South, a threefold increase over the amount pre-positioned in 2009. Similarly, it is estimated that only two of the six essential pipelines (food and non-food items) will be fully pre-positioned in Southern Sudan by the onset of the rains, owing to a lack of financing.

65. To date, only 42 per cent of the funds requested for Southern Sudan through the consolidated appeals process have been received. The areas of returns and early reintegration, protection, agriculture, health and water and sanitation are the least funded, having received only 20 to 30 per cent of the funds requested. A total of \$22 million will be allocated from the Central Emergency Response Fund to cover some of the funding shortfalls. The lack of adequate and assured funding has an adverse impact on operations, and funding imbalances across sectors jeopardize the overall effectiveness of the humanitarian response. The risk of a humanitarian disaster later in 2010 is therefore significant. Further increases in capacity on the ground and in resources are therefore urgently needed.

Recovery and development

66. The United Nations country team has stepped up its advocacy for greater investment by the Government in the social and human development areas, addressing both the national Government and the Government of Southern Sudan. The UNDP Rapid Capacity Placement Initiative to boost United Nations support to states in Southern Sudan gained momentum during the reporting period. By mid-May 2010, more than 50 of the 150 international United Nations Volunteers, who are to implement the programme, had been recruited and commissioned to various states. These include specialists in information technology, financial management and urban development and rule-of-law officers.

67. As part of a major initiative to support democratic processes, UNDP will provide assistance to the Government of Southern Sudan, through the Ministries of Cabinet Affairs, Parliamentary Affairs and Labour, for the organization of an orientation programme for the 170 elected members of the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly. The programme will provide sensitization training, information, education, guidance and background materials to Assembly members to assist them as they begin their first term.

Return and reintegration

68. As in previous years, returns of internally displaced persons increased towards the end of the dry season. In Kosti, more than 10,000 individuals have passed through the transit hub since January 2010, in spontaneous movements to the places of their previous residence, located primarily in Abyei, Upper Nile, Southern Kordofan, Warrap and Northern Bahr El Ghazal States. Furthermore, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that there had been an organized repatriation movement in which 264 Sudanese had travelled back to Central Equatoria State from Uganda. By 12 June, the number of Sudanese refugees repatriated to Southern Sudan and Blue Nile State since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 had reached a cumulative total of 330,016. That number includes 1,820 individuals whose return was supported by UNHCR in 2010.

VII. Governance and human rights

Rule of law

69. The Mission continues to monitor and support the legislative reform process through workshops and analysis of new legislation. The Prison Advisory Unit's capacity-building training programme and assessment of prison facilities in the Three Areas are ongoing. The Government has agreed to the deployment of UNMIS prison advisers in the transitional area prisons, which has provided a significant opportunity to improve prison system infrastructure and professional capacity in those areas. In Southern Sudan, the long-delayed Prisons Bill is still pending. UNMIS continues to provide advisory support to the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, the Ministry of Legal Affairs and the judiciary.

Human rights

70. Since the elections, a number of additional incidents involving the curtailment of political rights and freedoms have been reported. The Chairman of the Popular Congress Party (PCP), Hassan Abdallah Al-Turabi, arrested by the National Intelligence and Security Service on 16 May without formal charges, was not released until 30 June. In addition, the former Chairman of the National Democratic Alliance, Farouq Abu Eissa, was arrested on 20 May and briefly detained. Four journalists from the PCP-affiliated *Rai Al-Shaah* were arrested on 16 May and charged with "terrorist acts" and "undermining the Constitution". Both charges carry penalties of death or life imprisonment.

71. The Government's pre-print censorship of newspapers, suspended in September 2009, resumed on 4 June. As a result of censorship, the Communist Party newspaper *Al Midan* has not been printed since 4 June and several issues of the SPLM-aligned *Ajrass Al-Hurriya* have not been published.

72. Following the SPLM victory in the Blue Nile State gubernatorial elections, SPLA soldiers reportedly harassed, arbitrarily arrested, detained and employed violence against NCP supporters, causing many to flee to Ed-Damazin in fear for their lives.

73. After covering the violent dispersal by SPLA of a political rally that left three civilians dead, a radio journalist was arrested on 23 April in Unity State and

detained for 13 days and then dismissed from the State-owned radio station. On 21 May, National Intelligence and Security Service personnel arrested nine Southern Sudan Radio and Television staff members and detained them for 16 days after a strike prevented them from covering the Government of Southern Sudan presidential and Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly inaugurations.

VIII. Cross-cutting issues

Public information

74. The Public Information Office focused on election-related activities during the reporting period. UNMIS assisted the National Elections Commission with the production of civic education materials, and produced election-related materials to facilitate national, regional and international media coverage.

75. Since February 2010, the United Nations-sponsored Radio Miraya has doubled the length its daily short-wave broadcasts from three to six hours. Despite the increasing need for a nationwide broadcast media outlet, the national Government has still not assigned the radio station an FM frequency in Northern Sudan.

Conduct and discipline

76. As a result of concerted efforts by UNMIS to prevent misconduct during the elections period, only minor cases were reported. Training and awareness-raising workshops were conducted in all sectors, and the continued monitoring of risk factors was undertaken during the period of the elections.

77. The Mission continued to monitor the compliance of staff members with the United Nations code of conduct and zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and continued its outreach programme in Southern Sudan, providing public information with regard to that policy.

Gender

78. Southern Sudanese voters elected a total of 53 women to the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, exceeding the legally mandated minimum by 11 seats. The previous Assembly had not included female representatives. Seven women have been appointed to ministerial positions in the Government of Southern Sudan and eight in the national Government, two as national ministers and six as State ministers.

79. UNMIS continued to provide technical support for the National Action Plan on Violence against Women, developed by the Ministry of Justice. In May, the Ministry of Gender, Social Welfare and Religious Affairs of the Government of Southern Sudan requested the Mission's support in developing a strategic plan for the implementation of the Southern Sudan gender policy.

HIV/AIDS

80. The Mission persevered in its provision of support for the integration of HIV/AIDS awareness in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and conducted an awareness-raising and capacity-building campaign that targeted 3,059 former combatants and community members (1,932 men and

1,127 women) in the period from 15 March to 30 April. UNMIS also carried out training workshops for former combatants and community police members in Juba, Khartoum and Rumbek.

Staff security

81. Criminality and banditry, which are on the increase in the South, continue to pose a threat to United Nations staff. The Department of Safety and Security received reports of approximately 50 incidents of theft, break-in, criminal damage and road banditry against United Nations staff, vehicles and residences during the reporting period. A total of 11 United Nations international staff members and 14 national staff members were arrested by local police. The many missions that United Nations staff members undertake and the long distances that they travel increase the frequency of their exposure to such risks.

Coordination with other peacekeeping missions

82. UNMIS has been sharing information on LRA with the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo/United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and UNAMID in order to more effectively address LRA threats. Inter-mission military force conferences have promoted regular interaction between UNMIS and neighbouring United Nations missions, most recently on 2 and 3 June in Uganda on LRA activities. Cooperation with UNAMID was essential and proved beneficial during the Rizeigat-SPLA clash on the Western Bahr El Ghazal-Southern Darfur border at the end of April, as UNMIS movement to the area was obstructed. On 7 June, UNMIS, UNAMID and the Joint Mediation Support Team met to discuss strategic and political cooperation and the regional dimension of Sudanese conflicts.

Financial aspects

83. The General Assembly, by its resolution 64/283 of 24 June 2010, appropriated for the maintenance of UNMIS for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011, an amount of \$938.0 million. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNMIS beyond 30 April 2011, the cost of maintaining the Mission until 30 June 2011 would be limited to the amounts approved by the General Assembly. As at 31 May 2010, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNMIS amounted to \$183.3 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to \$1,371.8 million. Reimbursement of troop-contributing Governments for troop- and contingent-owned equipment costs has been made for the periods up to 31 May 2010 and 31 March 2010, respectively.

IX. Observations and recommendations

84. Despite operational challenges and shortcomings, the successful conduct of the national elections marked a critical milestone in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and provided for the expansion of the political space available for democratic change. The elections were generally peaceful, albeit with some significant exceptions, and gave many Sudanese their first voting experience. However, given the absence of elections during the past 24 years, the

process of democratization is still fragile and slow to take root. The failure to reform certain provisions of the legal framework, the resumption of pre-publication media censorship and the arrest, interrogation and harassment of opposition leaders in both the North and the South represent a serious setback. I strongly encourage both Comprehensive Peace Agreement partners to work with all political parties in a transparent manner to maintain and expand the nascent democratic space, including, in particular, law reform consistent with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Interim Constitution of the Sudan, which is critical for the remaining Comprehensive Peace Agreement processes, especially the referendums.

85. I congratulate the parties on the establishment of the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission. I urge the parties to recognize that the pending issues outlined must be addressed immediately in order for the referendum to be conducted within the Comprehensive Peace Agreement time frame. At this point, further delays might have serious implications. The parties' ongoing difficulties in addressing critical outstanding issues, including the establishment of the Abyei Referendum Commission, border demarcation and the resolution of voter eligibility questions in Abyei, are likely to further impede timely preparations.

86. The referendums will require significant international support if they are to be viewed as credible. While the parties have indicated their desire for extensive United Nations involvement in the referendum processes, they have yet to agree on the precise scope of the United Nations role. However, the activation of the Referendum Commissions and a joint request by the parties detailing the required additional support and role is a precondition for precise planning and timely delivery. I encourage the parties to provide such a joint request as soon as possible. I urge the parties to take full advantage of UNMIS and other international partners' offers of material, technical, logistical and "good offices" assistance.

87. The provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement foresee international monitoring of the referendums, and both parties intend to request the United Nations to provide monitors to work alongside the observers whom they plan to invite from several Governments and international institutions. International monitoring, which is stipulated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement as necessary, will be critical for the credibility and acceptance of the referendum outcomes and for subsequent peace. Appropriate modalities to ensure this may need to be considered. I propose to make certain recommendations in this regard, in consultation with the parties, as well as with other stakeholders, whose concerns need to be addressed. In doing this, I am aware that the responsibilities and roles of existing United Nations technical teams should not be duplicated.

88. The need for a workable agreement on post-referendum arrangements remains acute. I welcome the parties' agreement on a procedural framework and African Union facilitation for bilateral talks on post-referendum arrangements. I emphasize that efforts will have to be accelerated to provide the necessary clarity on critical questions within the time remaining. UNMIS and other international partners stand ready to assist the parties during the negotiations and to support the implementation of agreements they reach.

89. The role of the United Nations in the Sudan will not end with the referendums. During the reporting period, UNMIS initiated a strategic planning process focusing on the role of the United Nations, both for the remainder of the interim period and beyond, as provided for in Security Council resolution 1919 (2010). The results of

that process will form the basis of consultations with the parties that will not only identify the most pressing needs of the Sudan, but also lay out the best options to address those needs.

90. Localized political tensions that might pose a threat to the peaceful conduct of the Abyei referendum are a major concern. I encourage the parties, as well as Misseriya and Ngok Dinka leaders, to show vision and statesmanship in improving the political environment by pursuing a comprehensive agreement addressing the key contentious issues, including residency, grazing rights, North-South border management, land claims and the conduct of the referendum itself.

91. Continued restrictions on the freedom of movement of UNMIS by both parties, in violation of the Status of Forces Agreement, seriously compromise the ability of the Mission to monitor and verify the implementation of security arrangements and to assist the parties in preventing conflict and instability. The recent agreement in the Ceasefire Political Commission on freedom of movement is a positive step, but a broader commitment is needed in this regard if the Mission is to discharge its mandated responsibilities. I call upon the parties to fully comply with all of their obligations under their agreements, the Status of Forces Agreement and the relevant Security Council resolutions.

92. Intra-South tensions have mounted in the aftermath of the elections. Establishing stability and security in the South and managing the electoral fallout will be a challenging task for the Government of Southern Sudan in the months ahead. The need to provide a secure environment conducive to the conduct of the referendum in Southern Sudan is heightening that challenge. The military stand-off over the results of the Jonglei gubernatorial race is of great concern in this regard. Escalating local crises could easily provide opportunities for spoilers if such crises are not addressed in an appropriate and sustainable manner.

93. Given the possibility of violence in the latter stages of the interim period, the Mission and the United Nations country team are undertaking a contingency planning exercise to prepare for potential disruptions and ensure an adequate response to the needs of people, including the protection of civilians. In this regard, I encourage the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to ensure appropriate contingency planning for the protection of civilians and to publicly advocate against any form of violence against civilians. Further capacity-building of police and rule-of-law institutions in Southern Sudan will be critical for maintaining a peaceful environment during the referendums.

94. The popular consultation process provides a unique opportunity for a nuanced and detailed review of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. I call on the parties and their representatives and constituents in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States to offer and facilitate a serious appraisal. This process must transcend narrow partisanship if it is to contribute to sustainable conflict resolution in those areas. UNMIS stands ready to assist not only with the consultations but also with placing the processes in the wider political context of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Sudan as a whole.

95. The risk associated with the demobilization of increasing numbers of former combatants without suitable reintegration programmes in place is a serious security concern. I encourage all parties to continue their efforts to ensure both the integrity

and progress of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme while taking into account the need for flexible short-term solutions in particular situations.

96. Finally, I urge donors to ensure that the much-needed humanitarian assistance is not curtailed by underfunding and to safeguard the continuation of life-saving pipelines by making funds available as quickly as possible in this critical period. I also encourage donors to strengthen longer-term recovery activities in parallel with immediate relief efforts to ensure stability and sustainable development in the Sudan, in particular in the South.

97. I would like to conclude by expressing my appreciation for the dedicated service of my Special Representative for the Sudan, Haile Menkerios, as well as all military, police and civilian personnel serving in UNMIS.

**Security Council**

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General Assembly
Sixty-fourth session
Agenda item 10
Report of the Peacebuilding Commission

Security Council
Sixty-fifth year

**Letter dated 19 July 2010 from the President of the
Security Council addressed to the Chairperson of the
Peacebuilding Commission**

I have the honour to refer you to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1645 (2005).

In a letter dated 27 May 2010 addressed to the Secretary-General that was forwarded to the Security Council on 14 June 2010, the Permanent Representative of Liberia to the United Nations requested that Liberia be placed on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission. The Security Council supports that request and invites the Peacebuilding Commission to provide advice on the situation in Liberia.

The Security Council would welcome, first and foremost, the Peacebuilding Commission's advice and recommendations, following close consultation with the Government of Liberia, on the requirements necessary to help accelerate progress in meeting key benchmarks, such as those set out by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), in the following areas:

- Strengthening rule of law;
- Supporting security sector reform;
- Supporting national reconciliation.

The Security Council views Liberia's request as an important step on the country's, and indeed the region's, path to stability and lasting peace. We encourage the Peacebuilding Commission to consider where it might add value in the near term to critical peacebuilding concerns in Liberia.

(Signed) U. Joy Ogwu
President of the Security Council

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* Reissued for technical reasons on 23 July 2010.